Introduction

David Fischer of the World Affairs Council: Last time I saw you, there you are, okay, and Francis Boscacci of the PanAmerican Society. If you are not a member of one of these organizations and interested in Latin American affairs, I urge you to seek out one of us and get some information on upcoming events.

We are going to discuss this morning the state of U.S. - Chilean relations, a country with obviously enormous trade opportunities for the United States. And our speaker this morning is the Honorable Gabriel Guerra-Mondragon. Ambassador Guerra became a U.S. Ambassador to Chile, in July of 1994, and, during his distinguished career in foreign service, he has served in Nicaragua, Mexico City and Colombia. He was also the deputy program director for Latin America and the Caribbean at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs from 1984 to 1986. Ambassador Guerra returned to the private sector in 1986 as vice-president of the National Strategies and Marketing Group and, since 1987, has been president of TKC International in Washington D.C.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome to the Council and welcome to San Francisco. You join such distinguished company as Dave Letterman who are visiting, so give us the top ten list, all right.

(Applause)

Speech

Ambassador Guerra-Mondragon: Good morning. Is always good for me to be back in San Francisco in one of my favorite cities in the world. Unfortunately, I will not be here too long since I have to go to L.A. and then Mexico City. Before I begin, I would like to give my thanks to the sponsors of this event, the World Affairs Council of Northern California, Bay Area World Trade Center, the Chilean Chamber of Commerce, David Fisher, and an old friend, Ambassador Pastorino -- we served together when I was in the foreign service in Mexico City. I will speak for about ten to fifteen minutes and no more than that, and then of course I will open the session to questions that you may have on what I have spoken or any other questions that you may have to me. As many of you know, Chile is a special country in our hemisphere. There are many reasons for Chile's uncommonness but the essence of the country's uniqueness is that Chile comprises a rapidly growing, developing economy, an exceedingly well-managed democracy, with the fact that the Chilean government is working just as hard as we are on just these matters. As many of you may remember, shortly after President Eduardo Frei assumed office in 1994, he traveled to Washington D.C. on his first visit, where he met President Bill Clinton. And they agreed to establish a consultative framework. This is a domestic tranquillity necessary for democracy to prosper and is endowed with innovative entrepreneurs and courageous -- I'm sorry. I know there is something wrong here -- This consultative framework is the framework which established the relationship on a formal basis between Chile and the United States. This is a high level dialogue among the senior officials of both governments to discuss issues of mutual interest between our two countries and a very important network through which our two governments can communicate our interests and aspirations. Pursuant to this framework, Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Chile in February of this year, and held important and productive discussions with Chile's President Frei as well as Foreign Minister Jose Miguel Insulza. Since both the United States and Chile are members of the U.N. Security Council, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister took time to reaffirm our cooperation on global issues ranging from Iraq to Cuba. For example, we have just finished a close collaboration on the issue of China at the U.N. Human Rights Commission meetings in Geneva. In the few areas where we differ, we listened carefully to each other, and we respect each other's views and that is the basis of this very cordial and positive and mature relationship we now have with Chile. Then in March, Secretary of Defense William Perry also visited Chile, and met with his counterpart to discuss security cooperation in this hemisphere and the world. This has helped us to develop the important aspect of trust in our bilateral cooperation. Underscoring that effort the United States exhibited a wide range of our most advanced military aircraft ath the FIDAE air show in Santiago during March, the biggest such event in this part of the world. We discussed regional security issues and issues of military cooperation that remain very important to both countries. In addition to receiving numerous visits from U.S. Senators and Congressmen, other U.S. officials interested in strengthening our commercial and political ties have come to Chile recently. Secretary of Transportation Federico Pea visited Santiago in April for hemispheric meeting of transport ministers. While in Santiago Secretary Pea held talks with his Chilean counterpart to promote U.S. participation in Chile's major projects in the transportation sector. The Secretary also discussed expanded air service between the United States and Chile, as later this year we will have to renew our civil aviation agreement. What does all this high level interest show? I believe it demonstrates a recognition of Chile's accomplishments and our interests in adding to the mutual benefit they represent through trade, investment and in many other ways. Also, by recognizing the county's achievements, Chile showcases the potential of all of Latin America and the Caribbean to achieve the same thing. Let me cite some of what I think is impressive data on Chile. The real growth of Chile's economy may surpass seven percent this year. Chile's economy has averaged 6.5 percent real growth for the last twelve years. That is among the world's best country performances; and Chile's high domestic savings and investment rates, 28 percent of GDP, the highest in this hemisphere, should ensure sound growth of the economy into the twenty-first century. Second, U.S. exports to Chile rose to $3.8 billion in 1995 from $2.6 billion in 1994. Chile is expected to import $16 billion worth of goods in 1996. Three total foreign investments in Chile amounted to $4.3 billion in 1995. The U.S. investors continue show great confidence in Chile. Our enterprises poured over $1.5 billion in direct investment into Chile in 1995, more than thirty percent increase over 1994. Inflation has moderated. It has dropped from a rate of 27% in 1990 to 8% in 1995. The rate is expected to edge up a bit further in 1996. Prudence by independent central bank and strong flow of dollars from exports and investments have kept the Chilean peso relatively stable. The currency has averaged from 405 Pesos to 415 Pesos per dollar over the last twelve months. No abrupt decline in the peso value is expected in the foreseeable future. Now let me go to a subject that may be of interest to some of you, which is this issue of Chile's accession to NAFTA. With all this good news, that is with all this evidence of very good management and Chile's skillful facilitation of enterprise, the United States government believes Chile would become a first class addition to NAFTA. An example of what we and our NAFTA partners are looking for in new members, countries with strong open economies, and progressive and perfectable trade and investment rules. Indeed, that is the way we and our NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico, view Chile's application to join. From Chile's point of view belonging to NAFTA would open new vistas of opportunity and influence, both regionally and in the wider world arena. Membership would also give Chile preferential access to the North American market, the premiere world market and that of its largest trading partner, the United States, and would give Chile a leg up on other mid-size developing countries in negotiating with other economic areas, such as the European community, APEC and Mercosur. From North America's vantage point, Chile offers the current NAFTA countries a growing market for all manner of goods and services: consumer and capital goods as well as technology. The modernizing influence arising from membership in NAFTA could give Chile just the boost it needs to join the ranks of the developed countries early in the next century. The Chileans, hearing all the plaudits from the NAFTA partners on Chile's economic and political progress fully assumed that Chile would join NAFTA in 1995. Thus, you can imagine the great disappointment in Santiago when it became evident late last year that the U.S. Congress and the executive branch would not be able to reach agreement on language on the so-called fast-track authority to negotiate Chile's accession into NAFTA. Chile is convinced that the fast-track mechanism is an essential element for the negotiation of critical issues of her accession into NAFTA. Without fast-track, the U.S. Congress would essentially require a renegotiation of the agreement point by point, something that, of course, Chile did not want to get into. So, why has the fast-track proposal failed so far to pass in the U.S. Congress? I think it failed for four principal reasons. First, the President had asked for authority from the Congress to negotiate provisions on labor and environmental standards in the Chilean accession, but most of the Republican members in the House objected to those lateral agreements. They prefer that the provisions of these matters be left out on trade negotiations. Second, NAFTA is currently out of favor with many Americans for reasons that have mostly to do with the Mexican peso crisis and the political problems that country still faces. Third, a number of representatives in this Congress question the benefits of free trade. And fourth, fast-track authority was withheld because Congress, approaching the 1996 elections, wished, I think, to deny President Clinton's administration a foreign affairs victory, which Chile's succession to NAFTA would definitely have been one of them. As a result of the lack of U.S. Congressional action on fast-track, it is doubtful that this legislation will have a chance of being passed until after the November elections. Chile will wait patiently for the legislation and will aim for an early entry into NAFTA. Meanwhile, Chile is conducting its trade diplomacy actively and is pursuing opportunities with the European Union and Mercosur, the trading block which comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. And, Chile is currently negotiating a free trade agreement with Canada, it already has one with Mexico, while waiting for the U.S. to decide what it will do on the issue of NAFTA and Chile. The President has said clearly the United States remains committed to Chile's accession to NAFTA, and he has instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to explore every opportunity for progress on the matter. Now to the subject of Chile's democracy. I mentioned at the beginning of my speech that Chile is a very strong and viable democracy. It is a young democracy in the sense that democracy lapsed in Chile during the period of dictatorship between 1973 and 1990. Since 1990, Chile had been re-learning the practice of democracy, so it is logical to question the stability and the robustness of Chile's democracy. One good touchstone was the imprisonment of ex-Chilean Intelligence Chiefs, General Manuel Contreras and Brigadier Pedro Espinoza who ordered the assassination in Washington in 1978 of former Chilean ambassador to the United States Orlando Letelier and Robby Moffet. The Chilean public waited patiently during this period as the Chilean judicial system proceeded with its prosecution of this case. The carrying out of justice in this case was slow, but it was sure, and it showed that in spite of opposition from many in the military to punishing Contreras and Espinoza, no one is above the rule of law in Chile. The fact that the Chilean military did not lose face during its transition to democracy is an extremely important element in the enduring success of the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Rather than leaving office disgraced and humiliated as they have in other countries in the Americas, the Chilean military saw their leaving political office as a bowing to the will of the electorate in the plebiscite in 1988. The genius of Chilean domestic political relations and the prime reason why the transition to democracy has continued smoothly in the six years since democracy was re-established is that the right and the left, military and the civilians, have avoided conflict over difficult structural issues such as the appropriateness of a guaranteed role for the Chilean military in the government. The Chilean Constitution, for example, reserves nine seats in the Chilean Senate for members designated by the President of the Armed Forces, the Supreme Court, and the Chilean Government National Security Council. Only the remaining thirty-eight members of the Senate are popularly elected. Both the current President of Chile and his predecessor, President Aylwin, have fought to eliminate these appointed senators without success.

The other item of the political agenda concerns the reconciliation of the Chilean people. Although Chile was spared the vicious civil war fought between the right and the left wings of other Latin American countries, it endured years of military government and leftist terrorism. Memories of this violence are vivid and continue to alienate Chileans one from another. The Chilean government has sought to put this terrible epoch behind by trying to promote revelations of the fate of those who disappeared and at the same time establishing a sort of qualified amnesty for the perpetrators, in large part to induce them to come forward to share in confidence information on the fate and whereabouts of their victims. Of course, what this approach requires is ultimately a collective willingness to forgive. In November of last year, General Augusto Pinochet, who is still Commander of the Army and is revered by many Chileans, for the first time lamented the victims of both sides during his rule. And for their part, in private, the Left often point out how few human rights violators are still at large. However, recent efforts towards a law useful to reconciliation, and both sides have shown great forbearance in avoiding the demagoguery on this subject, have taken place in the full glare of heated public debate and show that more time must pass before forgiveness is possible.

I mentioned earlier the special relationship our two countries enjoy, and I believe that, in spite of the setback we are experiencing in Chile's accession to NAFTA, that our bilateral relations will only grow closer. Chilean foreign minister Insulza has made clear that Chilean government's position that this setback on NAFTA will not diminish our excellent bilateral relations. In fact, Chile and the U.S. see eye-to-eye on most issues. For example, as a result of our close cooperation on the Security Council at the U.N., Chile's Ambassador to the United Nations joined the State Department in condemnation of the Cuban government for its cowardly downing of two unarmed general aviation aircraft over international waters near Cuba some months ago. The essence of U.S.- Chilean relations is our shared common values and aspirations, the power of democracy, human rights and open economies, and the goals of hemispheric peace and integration. However, with special relationships flow special responsibilities. For our part, we should anticipate that Chile will continue to offer substantial support to U.S. policies both regionally and beyond. However, we have to keep in mind that Chile, by habit, is always wary to break with Latin American consensus positions on many issues, particularly on regional ones. Though Chile supported us to the hilt on the Cuban downing of the aircrafts; Chile, along with virtually all Latin American countries, has been unsympathetic to U.S. efforts to punish Cuba economically. Chile believes Cuba should indeed correct its human rights abuses, but should be allowed to grow and evolve economically in the hopes that it will evolve politically.

Before I close, I would like to repeat what I said about the excellent state of U.S.-Chile relations. I also want to reiterate that Chile will pursue good economic and political alliances wherever she can find them, regionally or extra-regionally. We must keep in mind that the longer Chile remains outside of NAFTA, the more Chile will orient itself to other trading partners. I think it is a shame for us to force Chile to look away from the United States for alternative economic opportunities. And I hope that we will be able to resume negotiations with Chile on NAFTA accession as soon as possible in 1997. Thank you for your attention, and I am ready to take any questions you may have. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

Questions and Answers

Elaine Maurer: I would like to recognize a couple of people who we have here in our audience today. One is Ambassador and Consul General lvaro Zuiga from the Chilean Consulate to the United States and also the President of our Chilean-American Chamber of Commerce, Jorge Bernales. And now I would like to take questions that you can ask Ambassador Guerra. I think we have a mike here, so, if people want to come up to the mike, that might be helpful.

Q. I am James Bridgman from Aspelin and Bridgman here in the City. I have two quick questions Ambassador. First, how do Mexico and Canada feel about entry of Chile into the NAFTA agreement, and what will be Chile's relationship to the Mercosur after entry?

A. As I mentioned during my speech, Chile already has a trade relation agreement with Mexico which was completed about three years ago. So, Mexico was and is supportive of Chile's accession to NAFTA. With respect to Canada also, they don't have a trade agreement yet but they are working on one right now as we speak. The Chileans are in Ottawa. And the conversations are going very well. They have now met three times and the idea is that they will conclude this bilateral trade agreement sometime, if not in July, in September, and President Frei will then go to Ottawa sometime this year where then they will sign. And Canada I have to say has been a major booster of Chile's accession to NAFTA. They are very supportive, and I think this bilateral trade agreement that they are working on now will be successfully concluded, and, since this is done within the confines of the NAFTA trade agreement, it will also help to accelerate the four country discussions hopefully next year when they sit down to discuss Chile's accession to NAFTA. Oh, I'm sorry. Mercosur, I think that since NAFTA did not occur last year, it behooved President Frei to seek a hit, a good one, and I think that that pushed the Mersur countries especially Brazil, Argentina and Chile to politically move and remove the obstacles that existed between them, which were in the negotiating table with the negotiators, and I think that they have successfully done that. And everything indicates that by June 25th of this year, they will sign this special relationship between Chile and Mercosur. Chile will not join Mercosur; it will not be a part of Mercosur, but it will have a special relationship with Mercosur.

Q. Good morning. My name is Jaime Mok, and I would like to do a follow up on the Mercosur question. I understand that one of these stumbling blocks for Chile joining Mercosur was the fact that some of the goods from Brazil coming to Chile will have a lower tariffs than Chilean goods going over to Brazil, and I heard that the Chilean people feel that the deal that Chile was signing onto for Mercosur would not be the most appropriate for Chile. Can you elaborate on that, whether that has been the case, or how are they going to fix that problem, if indeed, it is a problem?

A. There were problems, but I don't think that that was one of them. I think one of the problems for Chile was, as they call it in Chile, the traditional cultural crops: wheat, corn, rice, soya, were going to be excluded, or at least at the beginning Chile wanted them to be excluded. I think that Chile decided that they -- in order to get rid of one of these stumbling blocks, so they had to be included. They have now an eighteen-year span of time to lower the tariffs on these goods. And of course eventually that will be to the benefit of Argentina. Argentina on the other side of the cultural big guys are upset because they would have liked that eighteen year to be zero or five years. So, I think everybody gave in on different areas. I think Brazil on the area of what they would have liked to expand their exports into Chile, especially on manufacturing goods, including cars. Again it is a long-term phase out, but they accept that. I think the important thing here was that all these countries -- that always happens in trade negotiations that nobody is ever happy. But I think some other aspects of trade negotiations, you always have to give in. Sometimes you lose and sometimes you win in certain areas. And I think balance-wise, it was to the benefit of three principal countries: Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It was to their benefit to reach some kind of an agreement. They're both now three democracies; they have good relations. President Menem and President Cardoso and President Frei -- they visit each other often, they are in continuous telephone conversations with each other. I think that it is a positive sign is that you do have democracies for the first time in three countries in many years, and that they respect each other and they like each other. President Cardoso lived in Chile for many years in the sixties when he was in exile from Brazil. So, his second home is Chile. President Frei and President Cardoso like each other a lot, and respect each other. And President Menem and President Frei, even though they are very different type of people, but because of that, they have also been able to establish a very good working relationship for the first time in decades between Chile and Argentina. So, I think it all bodes well for this region that you have economic integration at the same time that you have democracies trying to work their way out of problems that they have had for many years.

Q. A number of people have said that what protected Chile from what happened in Mexico were capital controls, investment controls, when in fact, in my opinion, favorable policies and fundamentals that they had in place really helped then to sustain in the crisis, but in the aftermath of that there seens to have been a lessening of pressure to remove those capital investment restrictions. Has there been any pressure from the U.S. side or response from the Chilean side regarding capital requirements in Chile?

Elaine: Would you let us know your name and your affiliation too?

Andrew Cummins, ----Capital

A. I think that Chile, for those of you that don't follow closely, Chile's financial laws and investment laws. Right now, and that was the gentleman was referring to, there are restrictions whereby, if you invest in Chile, you have to keep your profits at least a year in Chile. And that has been in the books now for a very long time, and I think that that was one out of many other considerations that helped Chile not be affected by Mexico's crisis as so many other countries in the region were -- I think also another important was not only the general economic stability but also the savings -- the tremendous savings they have of twenty-seven percent, based on the privatization of their social security system. But, all those things considered I think helped Chile stop the crisis at its door, but, on the issue as to whether or not this will be a subject of discussion when NAFTA comes forward, it will be, because it runs counter to some of the provisions of investments among the four countries. Of course the Chileans would like to keep it. That will be a subject of discussion. It's unclear as to what will happen during the discussions. There are those that favor keeping that because it shows , like on the Mexico crisis, that Chile was able to protect itself. That this fly-by-night capital flight which occurred in Mexico are not necessarily good for some countries, as it proved for Mexico. So there are arguments naturally that say that there should be no restrictions on investments into NAFTA countries, the very purest free traders. So, I think it is going to be a touchy area of discussion. Both sides will have, I'm sure, good arguments to make on the issue, and I think it is still unclear as to what the final outcome is going to be on that subject.

Q. Ambassador Guerra, as you well know many of us here in San Francisco look to Asia as well as to the South. I think we would be interested in knowing how does Chile see itself, and what role will it play and does it play in the whole Pacific Rim?

A. Well, as you may know, Chile was the second country that joined APEC a year ago. This will be President Frei's third meeting that he will go to APEC in Manila in November. I think the Chileans very quickly understood -- first they are Pacific nation -- they have a very long relation with the Pacific Ocean. And they have been aggressively pursuing trade with the Asian countries, especially after Chile returned to democracy in 1990. Prior to 1990 it was very difficult for Chile to start any kind of relations with almost any kind of government because of its military presence. But since 1990 they have aggressively pursued, both President Aylwin and President Frei, to expand their trade relations with the Asian countries. They have been very successful at it after the U.S., Japan is the largest investor in Chile and is also, in Asia as a block, the second in terms of Chile's exports. They produce things that the Asians like, like fish, as well as forestry goods that Chile aggressively now exploits to their benefit and to the benefit of the Asians. The trade delegation from Asian countries into Chile are just as frequent as ours, as well as the trade delegations of Chileans into the Asian countries. President Frei did spend a long amount of time in Asia when he was at the last APEC meeting in Japan, and he stayed about a week and a half traveling around different Asian countries. From what I hear, he plans to also continue to travel to some other countries when he goes to the Philippines. I think Chile, to answer your question, they know that they need to diversify their exports and they have successfully done so. They have almost split it equally between their exports to the U.S. and Canada, to the European, and to the Asian and to the Latin American countries. So, in that sense, that's another reason why they have been able to successfully seal themselves from the last Mexico crisis. Because their economic stronghold and their exports are not only in the hands of one group, so they are diversified and they have been very successful in diversifying their exports, and one of those strongholds and anchors that they have, I believe it's important to have, is with the Asian countries. They have just started, they have only been there now less than two years as member of APEC. And APEC as we know cannot really move forward until we get fast-track and we can then sit down and negotiate with the Asian countries. But once that is done, that will place Chile in a privileged situation because of the aggressive practices they have on marketing, and they are very good entrepreneurs, and they are well set for exports - different from other Latin American countries, as you know, that they have never looked at exports as a means of livelihood. So, I would just think that the relations to the Asian countries will continue to grow and become stronger.

Q. ____________________ (very very faint)

A. That's a good question, and I don't know. Maybe the Ambassador here from Chile can answer that better than I. I don't know of any. I mean I do know that salmon -- I know salmon is not indigenous to Chile. They brought this technology into Chile in the 80's, and they are now the second largest exporters of salmon in the world after Norway. It's an amazing development that they have done in the area of salmon. And, on the area of wine, they have very good wine -- very good prices, as you well know. And they have now, for example, surpassed Spain as the third now largest importer of wine into the U.S. France, Italy and now Chile. And they would take a very aggressive posture in their marketing here in the U.S. For example, yesterday I went to visit the here, in Napa Valley, the Mondavi Winery, and the Mondavi Corporation has just concluded the first successful U.S. investment of a U.S. winery in Chile, with a very good company in Chilean company called Err‡zuriz. It will be the $50 million investment. And I think that you will see more and more of that kind of joint venture between the Chilean and U.S. wine producers. But on the other new areas, I really don't know.

Q. Good morning. My name is Ivan Mok from Rey International Trading. My question is, given the fact that the U.S., Canada and Mexico have free trade agreements, and also Chile and Mexico have free trade agreements, is there any data that indicates that U.S. goods are actually getting into Chile via Mexico?

A. Chilean goods?

Q. No, U.S. goods going into Chile via Mexico?

A. Well, I don't know of any case, let's put it that way, since I have been in Chile or anybody else from Mexico or Washington that have claimed that somehow one of these countries is trying to sort of go through the back door and not be confined to their trade agreements. I haven't heard of either any complaints or cases like that.

Q. ________________ (very faint) It has to do with the other structural reforms that you have talked about __________________ (very faint) Is this a healthy situation

A. It is true what you say about Codelco. Codelco is the government copper mine, just to put it in a context, is sort of like the Pemex of Chile. During the military government, a provision was put into law whereby ten percent of Codelco's profits yearly go to the armed forces, so there is no doubt -- that's in addition to the regular budget that they get from Congress on personnel and administrative costs. So, they do, are very well funded. I would say that they are the best funded armed forces in the region. And they are very disciplined and they are very good. The relations in Chile in terms of civil - military relations is still conflicted, is still difficult, delicate. There are some aspects of the 1980 Constitution that we as U.S. government have stated in a yearly human rights reports that we don't particularly like. Like the ones that I just that I just mentioned to you on the designated senators and also the provisions by which the President of Chile can name generals into positions of commander in chief of the armed forces, but he cannot remove them. That is of course a major stumbling block to have civilian control over the military for obvious reasons. But that is still ___(cut off)

2/3 majority to amend the constitution or it becomes very difficult. If you have those nine and you don't have other members of the opposition come forward with the government coalition which is what happened this time around -- this last time when they spent over eight months discussing these amendments to the Constitution without any success. And they failed to get the right number of senators. It wasn't even voted. It never even left committee to vote on the substance of the amendment. That's how acrimonious the fight was, that it wasn't even debated in full on the substance of the pros and cons of the amendments to the Constitution. So, it is still a touchy issue. It is too close to what happened both during the agenda period and also the military government. So, it still carries a lot of emotions on both the left as well as the right. But I think, at least in my view, is that time is on the side of democracy and that this is just a matter of time to happen and for these changes to occur in the Constitution. That it will take awhile for this acrimonious still sensitive issues to be -- maybe it will take one more generation to be totally off the table. But I think that the history was so -- it hit all Chileans so hard, whether you are from one side or the other, that nobody wants to go back to that or even get close to it. I think it is just a matter of time. But I think everybody is aware of it.

Q. John Meeker, attorney in private practice. I understand that in Chile they have moved from, with respect to environmental regulation, from a permissive to mandatory environmental impact reports. Do you see any affects on that on Chile's agricultural operations?

A. Chile, I would say, has returned to democracy in 1990. The government has made -- knows that if they want to compete, if they want to attract investments, and also be more aggressive on their exports, they have to strengthen their environmental laws. I doubt that they would have been under incredible scrutiny by the outside world: the Europeans and us. And also that would have been an issue on the NAFTA discussions as it was an issue as well when Mexico when was being discussed. So they have in a fairly short period of time have passed legislation to make things more stringent and, as you say now, you do have to present mandatory environmental impact studies on a project that you make in Chile.